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The Federal Arbitration Act
and the Power of the District Court
This Note will explore an often litigated issue: whether a district
court has the power to issue a preliminary injunction in order to preserve
the status quo of the parties prior to arbitration of the case which it has
previously determined is arbitrable. This question "has divided the state
and federal courts."1 Furthermore, there is a division in thinking within
the circuits, and yet the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. At the
core of this issue is whether the Federal Arbitration Acte (FAA) requires a
federal court to "immediately divest itself of any power to act to maintain
the status quo once it decides that the case before it is arbitrable. "3 An
alternative interpretation is that the language of the FAA allows a federal
court to grant an injunction.
Section I of this Note will analyze the reasoning of one of the most
recent federal cases to examine this issue, Sp;eedee Oil Change Systems,
Inc. v. State Street_ Capital.4 Section II will discuss the other circuit court
opinions which are in accord with Speedee. Section III will examine the
Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts' reasoning for denying the power.
Section IV will explain why district courts do have this power, Section V
will examine the test the courts should use to determine the propriety of
granting or denying the injunction. Finally; Section VI will describe the
mootness problem facing the Supreme Court.
I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In Speedee, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana held that the ability to grant a preliminary injunction pending
arbitration is inherent in a district court's power. *The plaintiff, Speedee
Oil Change Systems, Inc. (Sper-dee) was a franchisor of car care service!
The parties entered into a franchise agreement providing for State-Street
Capital, Inc. (State Street) to be the regional franchisee in South Florida.
"The Franchise [Agreement] required State Street to collect franchise fees,
royalties, advertising futid payments and other payments applicable to the
individual agreements signed with the local retail dealers." 6 State Street
1. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 469 U.S. 1127, 1129
(1985) (White, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1024 (1985).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
3. RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g
denied, 865 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1989).
4. 727 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. La. 1989).
5. Id. at 290.
6. Id.
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was required to give some of the franchise fees and royalties as well as all
of the advertising fund payments to Speedee. In return, State Street was
to receive the exclusive license to use the name, logo, service marks and
confidential operating manuals that Speedee developed for the operation of
its franchises.' Speedee brought suit claiming State Street had breached
the contract, and sought injunctive relief to stop State Street from
continuing its operations as a regional franchisee.8 State Street argued
that it was wrongfully discharged, and it asked the district court to stay
the case and compel arbitration under the contract's arbitration clause.9
The arbitration clause read:
[Speedee Oil Change Systems] and the Region agree to submit any
claim, dispute, suit, action or proceeding between them or arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or any of the transactions
contemplated by it and involving [Speedee Oil Change Systems] to
binding arbitration pursuant to the rules for commercial arbitration of
the American Arbitration Association, such arbitration to be held at
the- Office of the American Arbitration Association located closest to
the office of [Speedee Oil Change Systems]."
The district court granted the defendant's motion to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration. It was then that the court faced an issue
of first impression in the Fifth Circuit: whether a district court has the
power to grant preliminary injunctive relief even though it stays the case
pending arbitration. The court answered this in the affirmative and
ordered a hearing to determine whether a preliminary injunction was
proper.
The court first had to decide whether the dispute was arbitrable. It
acknowledged the federal public policy, which has been recognized by its
circuit court of appeals to favor arbitration. Thus, the court did not agree
with the plaintiffs interpretation of the contract in question because such
an interpretation ignored "the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration," as illustrated in Place St. Charles v. J.A. Jones Construction
Co.
11
This federal policy of favoring arbitration was also discussed in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 2 In
that case, the Supreme Court stated that Congress' clear intent in the FAA
was "to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 823 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1987).
12. 460 U.S. 1 (1983)."
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arbitration as quickly and easily as possible."3 Moses involved both a
federal and a state action where each focused upon an identical issue of
arbitrability. The petitioner hospital wanted to stay the federal action
pending resolution of the state action. The district court-granted the stay,
but the Supreme Court thought this was wrong, because the refusal to
proceed was contrary to Congress' intent as evidenced by the FAA to
move the parties into arbitration. 4 The Supreme Court stated in Moses
that federal liw through the FAA governs the arbitrability of a dispute
whether that issue is in a state or federal cout.- ' s
Section 2 of the FAA!6 "is a congressional declaration of .a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.. The effect of the
section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act. 
"17
This statement suggests that the effect of the FAA is to dictate the
arbitrability of all disputes.
The Supreme Court has recently cited Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing Corp." as an example of the type of cases in
which the courts of appeals have consistently applied the federal policy
favoring arbitration. In Prima Paint, the parties had- signed a contract
which contained an arbitration agreement, but the. plaintiff ignored this
agreement and brought an action for rescission based on alleged fraud in
the inducement. The issue in this case was whether fraud in the
inducement was itself an arbitrable controversy. The Supreme Court held
that the language and policies of the FAA required the conclusion that the
issue of. fraud was arbitrable.' 9 The Supreme Court stated in Moses that
it agrees with the court of appeals that the federal policy favoring
arbitration. should be controlling in questions of arbitrability:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an. allegation of
13. Id. at 22.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 24.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction in;olving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.").
1.7. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24(1983).
18. 388 U.S.'395 (1967).
19. Id. at 402-04.
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waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Thus, the federal policy favoring arbitration has been firmly entrenched
and accordingly has led to significant consequences.
The court in Speedee discussed some of these consequences. Citing
Mar-Len of Louisiana v. Parsons-Gilbane,1 the court stated that an
arbitration clause in an agreement forms the basis for determining
arbitrability.' The Mar-Len court itself declaied that "[t]he question of
arbitrability is determined on the basis of the existence of an arbitration
clause that on its face appears broad enough to encompass the parties'
claims."' The Speedee court summarized another consequence stating
that "[w]henever the scope of an arbitration clause is reasonably doubtful
or debatable, the presumption of arbitrability mandates a decision which
favors arbitration. "4 In other words, whenever an arbitration clause
seems to govern the parties' disagreement, the court will enforce it, and
in situations where coverage of arbitration clauses is ambiguous, the court
will follow the federal policy which favors arbitration.
The court in Speedee found that the arbitration clause between
Speedee and State Street was not ambiguous. Therefore, the court
granted the defendant's motion to stay the court proceedings in order for
arbitration to occur. However, the court still had to decide whether it had
the power to order preliminary injunctive relief after staying the case
pending arbitration. Although this was a question of first impression in
the Fifth Circuit, other circuits had previously ruled on the question. The
Speedee court joined the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Seventh
Circuits in ruling that district courts do have the power to issue
preliminary injunctions after staying a case pending arbitration. However,
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have disagreed and have ruled that courts
do not have such power.
II. THE OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS' RESOLUTIONS
The First Circuit addressed this issue in Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek
20. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
21. 773 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
22. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc. v. State Street Capital, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 289, 291
(E.D. La. 1989).
23. Mar-Len of La., Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 338 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
24. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc. v. State Street Capital, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 289, 291
(E.D. La. 1989) (citing Mar-Len of La., Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 635 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
[Vol. 7:2 1992]
POWER OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Corp.2" In Teradyne, the defendant, Mostek Corporation, appealed from a
district court interlocutory order which was issued in favor of Teradyne.
That order required Mostek to place four million dollars of its assets in an
interest bearing account for the purpose of satisfying any judgment, or
arbitration award, in favor of Teradyne. This burden was thrust on
Mostek because it had previously ceased operations and sold its assets.' 6
Initially, Mostek had refused to pay order cancellation charges. It
then opposed Teradyne's demand for arbitration pursuant to a contract
provision. When Mostek eventually sold all of its assets to Thomson
Semiconductors, Teradyne sought the preliminary injunction to force
Mostek to set aside funds in order to satisfy any potential judgment
resulting from the arbitration proceedings. 27  After deciding that the
district court's interlocutory order was appealable, the First Circuit Court
addressed the effect of the FAA on the district court's power to grant
preliminary injunctive relief. Just as the district court in Speedee decided,
this circuit court ruled that "a court can, and should, grant a preliminary
injunction in an arbitrable dispute whenever an injunction is necessary to
preserve the status quo pending arbitration."'
The First Circuit followed the decisions from the Second, 29 Fourth"
and Seventh Circuits.3' These courts had felt that the language of the
FAA did not specifically address the issue. Even though the case was
arbitrable, a district court still had an obligation to determine the propriety
of an injunction in the case. Accordingly, since the language of the FAA
does not prohibit a court from issuing an injunction, a court should use its
equitable power to preserve the status quo.Z
In the Second Circuit, this issue was addressed in Roso-Lino
Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N. Y., Inc.33 In
Roso-Lino, the district court denied Roso-Lino a preliminary injunction.
This case involved a termination by the defendant of the plaintiffs eleven
year Coca-Cola distributorship. Roso-Lino brought suit claiming the
termination was wrongful and that Coca-Cola had engaged in price
discrimination, thereby violating the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
25. 797 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 44.
27. Id. at 45.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs.. Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 749
F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir.
1985).
31. Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics. Inc., 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
32. Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986).
33. 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984).
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1324 The district court judge decided the dispute was arbitrable under the
distributorship agreement. Yet, the judge refused to grant the plaintiff a
preliminary injunction believing that his decision to stay the proceedings
until arbitration was completed had "stripped the court of power to grant
injunctive relief. " s The circuit court relied on its decision in Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, and reversed the denial of the
preliminary injunction. It held that "[t]he fact that a dispute is to be
arbitrated . . . does not absolve the court of its obligation to consider the
merits of a requested preliminary injunction; the proper course is to
determine whether the dispute is 'a proper case' for an injunction. "3 In
other words, the court held that even if a court stays the litigation in order
for a dispute to be arbitrated, the court must still decide whether that case
is one which meets the requirements necessary for granting a preliminary
injunction.
In Erving, a basketball player filed suit for rescission of his contract
with a professional club. The Club then sought injunctive relief to
prevent the plaintiff from playing for another club during the arbitration
process. The district court granted the injunction to preserve the status
quo.38 Although this case might have been distinguished because Erving's
contract expressly authorized a preliminary injunction in the event of a
breach, the Second Circuit specifically noted that "[t]he provision relative
to 'obtaining an injunction or other equitable relief' is merely declaratory
of existing legal rights. "39 This statement suggests that the court would
have granted the injunction even if the contract had not expressly allowed
this type of relief because the Club had a legal right to an injunction.
The Third Circuit also addressed this issue in a similar situation.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc.,4' involved a contract dispute
between a biotechnology company, Amgen, and a subsidiary of Johnson &
Johnson, Ortho. The Plaintiff, Ortho, was granted a preliminary
injunction that prevented Amgen from receiving approval from the FDA
to produce EPO (a human protein normally produced in the kidney) by
itself. Previously, the two parties had agreed upon a joint license to
produce EPO. 4' After analyzing the language of the FAA, the circuit
court decided that the district court was not precluded from issuing an
34. Id. at 125.
35. Id.
36. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 749
F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d
1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1972)).
38. Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 1067.
40. 882 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1989).
41. Id. at 808-09.
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injunction. 0
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley."  Merrill Lynch had brought
suit against its former account executive seeking injunctive relief that
would prevent him from using Merrill Lynch's records and from soliciting
its clients." The district court granted the injunction and ordered
expedited arbitration. The circuit court examined the Act's language and
determined that the district court was not precluded from issuing an
injunction. The court declared that if the FAA was intended to have a
different meaning, Congress would have written it as such.' Without
language clearly indicating an intent to remove this power from the
judiciary, the court refused to interpret it as doing so. Additionally, the
court reasoned that Congress' goal was furthered by preserving the status
quo, thus providing an opportunity for arbitration to be effective. 1
A case arising in the Fifth Circuit involved a contract between the
prime contractor on a government project and the subcontractor.'
Tucker, the prime contractor, discovered that the subcontractor, RGI, was
not complying with federal regulations and terminated the contract. RGI
filed an action in the district court seeking an order to enforce arbitration
and an injunction reinstating the contract pending arbitration.' The Fifth
Circuit reviewed the language of the FAA and determined that it
contained nothing regarding the district court's power to act and
concluded that Congress' intent would be frustrated if the district court
was precluded from issuing the injunction. The court then held that the
district court could issue the injunction to further the arbitration process.'
The Seventh Circuit also decided this issue. In Sauer-Getriebe KG
v. White Hydraulics, Inc.,s° the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
repudiated a contract which had given the plaintiff manufacturing and
marketing rights to motors manufactured by the defendant. The alleged
repudiation occurred when the defendant announced it was negotiating for
the sale of its assets s' The plaintiff, wishing to exercise its contractual
right to arbitrate, asked for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
defendant from transferring any of its manufacturing rights pending
42. Id. at 812.
43. 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1048-49.
45. Id. at 1052.
46. Id. at 1054.
47. RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 858 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 228.
49. Id. at 229-30.
50. 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
51. Id. at 349.
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arbitration. s2 The district court refused to grant the injunction holding that
the contract was not repudiated. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The circuit court held that the plaintiff had not waived its right
to arbitrate by filing the suit. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to an
injunction, which would make its right to arbitration meaningful (in the
face of defendant's transfers before arbitration was settled). The circuit
court held that "the right to arbitrate and to seek injunctive relief were not
incompatible and that the plaintiff was not obliged to abandon one in order
to pursue the other. "3 Therefore, even though the plaintiff had filed suit,
the right to arbitrate was still valid. Additionally, the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration in
order that the right to arbitrate would not be rendered meaningless.
These circuit courts have used the same reasoning and policy
considerations to determine that district courts do have the power under
the FAA to issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo after
staying the litigation during arbitration. The Tenth and Eighth Circuits,
however, have reached a different conclusion.
III. THE EIGHTH AND TENTH CIRCUIT COURTS' DECISIONS
The Eighth and Tenths Circuits have concluded that the district
court does not have the power to grant an injunction to preserve the status
quo pending arbitration.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smnith, Inc. v. Hoveys' involved an
employment contract dispute where the employer sought an injunction to
prevent its five former employees from using records and soliciting
clients. The court found that the agreement was arbitrable under the FAA
because the employment contract contained an arbitration agreement.*7
However, the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of an
injunction finding an abuse of discretion. "In light of our determination
that the controversy is arbitrable, however, we find that the issuance of
injunctive relief abrogates the intent of the Federal Arbitration Act and
52. Id.
53. Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp.. 797 F.2d 43. 48 (st Cir. 1986) (citing Sauer-
Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.. 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1070 (1984)).
54. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir.
1984).
55. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith. Inc. v. Scott, No. 83-1480(10th Cir. May 12, 1983) (summary order staying the injunction pending arbitration)). In
Scott, the 10th Circuit vacated, by order and without formal written opinion, a preliminary
injunction that the district court had granted pending arbitration.
56. 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984).
57. Id. at 1287-88.
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consequently was an abuse of discretion."SS
The court believed that the language of the FAA" directs a court to
stay the judicial action. The court relied on Moses,6" in which the
Supreme Court stated that the congressional intent of the FAA was to
move the dispute into arbitration as quickly as possible. Therefore, the
court decided that even a limited hearing for an injunction was
inappropriate because the court would then be involved in the merits of
the dispute, which was the proper role of the arbitrator.6 The Hovey
court cited Prima Painto and Buffalo Forge.' In those cases, the
Supreme Court had refused to become involved in the merits of the case
because arbitration was pending. Those two cases provided sufficient
authority for the Hovey court to conclude that "where the Federal
Arbitration Act is applicable and no other qualifying contractual language
has been alleged, the district court errs in granting injunctive relief. "61
Other district courts are in agreement with this reasoning, although no
other court of appeals has issued such an opinion."s
However, the Hovey opinion is not as sound as it may appear at
first glance. In footnote 10," the court leaves open the possibility that
where the parties to the contract have contemplated arbitration beforehand,
and thus have provided for it in the contract, an injunction may be issued.
Footnote 10 discusses Erving,67 in which the court found the dispute was
arbitrable and also granted an injunction to maintain the status quo. The
Hovey court distinguished Erving by pointing out that the contract in
Erving expressly provided for injunctive relief and consequently the issues
to be determined on the propriety of injunctive relief were not the same as
issues on the merits." Footnote 10 leaves open the possibility of granting
58. Id. at 1291.
59. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
60. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
61. 726 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1984).
62. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (issue of
fraud in the inducement of contract was for the arbitrator).
63. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397 (1976)
(Court refused to enjoin strike pending arbitration of validity of strike).
64. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th
Cir. 1984).
65. Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shubert, 577 F. Supp. 406
(M.D. Fla. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. DeCaro, 577 F. Supp.
616 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F.
Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Smith v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575
F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
66. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 n.10
(8th Cir. 1984).
67. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
68. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 n.10
(8th Cir. 1984).
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an injunction. It seems that in a situation similar to Erving, where the
contract expressly provides for injunctive relief, the Hovey court would
rule that granting an injunction is appropriate.
A second item making the Hovey decision less persuasive is that two
months after that decision, another Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the
granting of a preliminary injunction where there was an arbitrable dispute
in Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc.69 In Ferry-Morse, the
defendant, Food Corn, had developed a seed corn which the plaintiff
wanted to market. The dispute involved an exclusive licensing agreement,
which was exchanged for royalties based on a percentage of the retail
price. The disagreement was over the meaning of "retail price." 70 The
plaintiff brought an action to compel arbitration and in addition asked for
a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to give the corn to the
plaintiff?1  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of the preliminary injunction, finding that the
plaintiff had met the irreparable harm burden. The court of appeals also
found that the district court properly ruled that the plaintiff had a
probability of success on the merits, and therefore, the district court had
not abused its discretion in granting the injunction. 2
Footnote 10 in Hovey, and the decision in Ferry-Morse make the
argument that the district court does not have the power to grant the
injunction less compelling.
IV. DISTRICT COURTS Do HAVE THE POWER
District courts do have the power to grant an injunction pending
arbitration. An examination of this issue must begin by looking at the
FAA. Section 3 of Title 9 states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration.
69. 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 592.
73. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
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The language of the FAA does not indicate clearly whether the courts
have been given the power to grant an injunction pending arbitration or
not.
However, the two sides apparently are in agreement in one area:
where the contract expressly provides for injunctive relief, all the courts
will probably grant it. The Fifth Circuit has stated that injunctive relief is
available where a case is stayed pending arbitration as long as the contract
suggests that the parties contemplated such relief.74 The Eighth Circuit
left open the possibility of an injunction where the parties had
contemplated its use beforehand in Hovey.S But, if the parties do not
contemplate such a remedy, then the question remains whether the court
has the power to grant the remedy or not.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson,76 the
court used the language of section 3 of the FAA in concluding that it was
prohibited from granting an injunction. That language provides that if the
court decides the dispute is arbitrable, "the court . . . shall . . . stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had . .. ."77 The court
found that "shall" was a mandatory term, once arbitration is determined
and "a stay under Section 3 is issued, the court cannot concern itself with
the merits of the dispute until arbitration has been had." 7s The court felt
that once it referred the case to arbitration, it could no longer address the
merits. Issuing an injunction would require a hearing, which the court
felt necessarily explored the merits of the case, and thus would cause
burdensome delays.
The Thomson argument, however, is not very persuasive. If
Congress had intended to include all actions within the judicial power,
then it certainly could have written the statute to do so explicitly. 9 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded in Bradley, "[w]e do
not believe that Congress would have enacted a statute intended to have
the sweeping effect of stripping the federal judiciary of its equitable
74. RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., 858 F.2d 227 (Sth Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 865
F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1989).
75. 726 F.2d 1286. 1291 n.10 (8th Cir. 1984).
76. 574 F. Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
77. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
78. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472,
1478 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
79. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) provides: "A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to effectuate
its judgments." See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1978) (filing of bankruptcy petition
operates as a stay of any "judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor.")
Anthony S. Fiotto, Note, The United States Arbitration Act and Preliminary Injunctions: A
New Interpretation of an Old Statute, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1041, 1049 (1986) (citing Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (1985)).
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powers in all arbitrable commercial disputes without undertaking a
comprehensive discussion and evaluation of the statute's effect. "go The
Bradley court concluded that "trial" as written in 9 U.S.C. § 3 means,
"the ultimate resolution of the dispute on the merits,""' and does not
include pretrial proceedings. The court then held that the FAA's language
does not prevent a district court from granting a preliminary injunction.
Additionally, the language of § 3 states that the courts should not
decide those issues that are referable to the arbitrator. The language only
states that the court must stay the trial of those issues that are being
referred to the arbitrator!' However, the goals of the FAA would not be
achieved if the court could not maintain the status quo. If a court
referred a case to arbitration, yet denied injunctive relief, then a party
could take such action that would irreparably harm the other party and
thereby render arbitration meaningless.
Even if the language of the FAA does not prevent the district court
from issuing a preliminary injunction, the court would be prohibited
where the policy of the FAA would be impaired. However, the majority
of courts feel that the congressional policy is furthered, not hindered, by
issuing an injunction. If courts are unable to preserve the status quo by
issuing an injunction, then one of the parties may be able to alter his
position so as to render the arbitration meaningless. If this is so, then
there is no reason for the dispute resolution process to take place at all.'
Still, injunctions will not be issued in all instances. Generally, the
courts have developed a test that the moving party must meet before an
injunction will be granted. For example, in the Third Circuit, there are
four factors that a court considers in determining whether a preliminary
injunction is appropriate or not:
(1) whether the movant has demonstrated reasonable probability of
eventual success in the litigation;
(2) whether the movant has demonstrated that it will be irreparably
injured pendenie lite if relief is not granted to prevent a change in
the status quo;
(3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant
or denial of the injunction, and
80. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (4th
Cir. 1985).
81. Id.
82. Philip E. Karmel, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act:
A Perspective from Contract Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1373, 1386-87 (1987).
83. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen. Inc., 887 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1989); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th Cir. 1985).
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(4) the public interest. (emphasis omitted)'
If these factors are met, then the party is entitled to an injunction. By
establishing these four criteria, a party shows that it is essential to grant
the injunction to prevent irreparable harm and preserve the status quo.
Parties who argue against the issuance of an injunction also argue
that the preliminary injunction will prejudice the arbitrator's subsequent
decision.' s  This argument fails, however, because the movant has
demonstrated only a reasonable probability of eventual success in the
litigation, and not in the arbitration. Furthermore, although a court
conducts a hearing to determine the appropriateness of an injunction, the
outcome of the litigation is never decided at that hearing. Therefore,
except in the event of an abuse by the district court, or an abuse by the
arbitrators, the granting of a preliminary injunction by the district court to
preserve the status quo pending arbitration seems to further the federal
policy behind the FAA: that policy is to "move the parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
possible."S6 This was the reasoning used by the district court in Speedee.
The goals of the FAA are reflected in its legislative history. This
history demonstrates an intent to reverse the common law courts' refusal
to enforce arbitration agreements.
The House Report accompanying the bill summarizes 'the need for
the law' as follows:
[it] arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some
centuries ago . . . English courts . . . refused to enforce...
agreements ... to arbitrate .... [Contemporary] courts have
felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned
without legislative enactment, although they have frequently
criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the
injustice which results from it.
According to this Report, 'the purpose of. . . [the Act] is to make
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration. .... "
In addition to the legislative intent stating the purpose of the FAA,
84. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
Constructors Assoc. of Western Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811. 814-15 (3d Cir. 1978)); see
also A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971).
85. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th
Cir. 1985).
86. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22
(1983).
87. Karnel, supra note 82, at 1391 (citing To Validate Certain Agreements for
Arbitration, H.R. REP. No. 96. 68th Cong.. 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the Supreme Court has also explained Congress' intent in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd." In Byrd, an investor sued his broker believing
that financial transactions had violated the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c), 78t, and various state law provisions.
Byrd alleged that an agent of Dean Witter acted improperly by trading
without prior consent, having an excessive number of transactions, and by
misrepresenting the status of the account.8 9 Although the parties had
signed an agreement to arbitrate, the broker tried to compel arbitration of
only the state law claims. Dean Witter assumed that the federal claims
were not arbitrable and could be resolved only in a federal forum.
Therefore, he did not seek to compel arbitration of those claims. The
district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed by holding that the FAA required
enforcement of the arbitration agreement even though it may result in
separate proceedings in different forums. 9°
[Although] Congress was [not] blind to the potential benefit of the
legislation for expedited resolution of disputes[,] . . . passage of the
Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to
enforce agreements into which parties had entered, and we must not
overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or
allow the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution
to overshadow the underlying motivation."
The Court found that the primary motivation for Congress to pass the
FAA was to enforce agreements between parties to arbitrate disputes.
The Court went further and held that when there is a conflict between
enforcing an arbitration agreement and quick resolution, then a court must
enforce the agreement to accommodate the legislature's intent.'
Thus, the Supreme Court established that the "principal objective"
of the FAA was to enforce arbitration agreements and that the need for
expedited dispute resolution is generally an incidental benefit. This
statement undermines the argument of many district courts' decisions in
denying an injunction.n These courts reasoned that the FAA denied
district courts the power to grant an injunction pending arbitration because
the purpose of the FAA was to expedite the dispute into arbitration.
88. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
89. Id. at 214.
90. Id. at 215-17.
91. Karmel, supra note 82, at 1393 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
92. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
93. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286
(8th Cir. 1984).
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Thus, a hearing on the appropriateness of an injunction would not meet
this purpose. However, since the Supreme Court has ruled that this
expedited resolution of the case is not the principal objective, but only a
benefit, this argument is no longer convincing.
The Arbitration Act's language is not prohibitive. Therefore, in
light of the legislative intent, and the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Byrd, the district court does have the power to grant an injunction to
maintain the status quo pending arbitration.
V. THE PROPER TEST
Today, courts have tests which they use to determine the propriety
of an injunction.' Most of these tests involve factors such as a
determination of the potential success in the litigation and a showing of
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.9' The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals used what it called a "hollow formality test" in
Bradley. 6 The court followed its holdings in Lever Brothers Co. v.
International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217,97 and Drivers,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v.
Akers Motor Lines, Inc.9 In Lever Bros., the court adopted its standard
for issuing preliminary injunctions in labor disputes:
An injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration may be
issued either against a company or against a union in an appropriate
Boys Markets case where it is necessary to prevent conduct by the
party enjoined from rendering the arbitral process a hollow formality
in those instances where, as here, the arbitral award when rendered
could not return the parties substantially to the status quo ante."
In Akers Motor Lines, the court held that if the injunction were not
granted and the conduct would result in a "hollow formality" of an
arbitration process, then the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
expressly forbids injunctive relief must yield to the federal policy favoring
94. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
97. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
98. 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978).
99. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1053 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554
F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976)).
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arbitration.'
The court found that if the conduct were not enjoined, then one
party could act so as to render the arbitration proceeding meaningless (or
a "hollow formality"). In such a situation, the action taken could prevent
the arbitrator's decision from restoring the status quo. Where actions,
which may irreparably alter the status quo, are possible, the court found
that an injunction should be issued to protect that status quo, finding that
only then will the arbitrator's decision be meaningful.
This hollow formality test used by the Fourth Circuit is the most
logical test to use. Congress has developed a federal policy which favors
arbitration. The Supreme Court has furthered this policy with a decision
that when arbitration agreements are ambiguous, they are to be interpreted
in light of this federal policy and consequently arbitration should occur., e
Yet, if the courts allow parties to take actions which may irrevocably alter
the status quo, then what use is this process when it takes away the power
of the arbitrator's decision? It is vital to the integrity of the arbitration
procedure that the arbitrator retain the power to render meaningful
decisions. In order to do this, the court must have the equitable power to
maintain the status quo by issuing necessary injunctions.
VI. MOOTNESS CONCERNS
The Supreme Court should finally settle this issue and officially
recognize this power of the district courts. In 1985, the Court denied
certiorari to a case" 2 which presented the question of whether section 3 of
the FAA bars a court from issuing a temporary injunction pending
arbitration of an employee contract dispute. Justice White dissented from
the denial of certiorari and wrote an opinion that was joined by Justice
Blackmun. Justice White noted that state and federal courts are divided
on the issue.ln Additionally, he wrote that since this issue is so
frequently litigated and important to arbitration agreements, the Court
should resolve it. However, an obstacle to review may be that the
question will be moot before any case reaches the Supreme Court. Justice
White stated that these cases fit into the exceptions to the general
mootness doctrine for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading
100. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048. 1053
(4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Teamsters Local
Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978)).
101. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
102. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 469 U.S. 1127
(1985).
103. Id. at 1129.
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review." 04 Therefore, Justice White concluded that unless the Court
applied this exception, it would never resolve the issue.1 However, since
two Justices would have granted review in 1985, perhaps the Court will
soon grant certiorari in light of the fact that the issue seems to be
continually litigated. The Supreme Court needs to render a decision in
order to remove doubts as to lower courts' power regarding arbitration
and to ensure the continued preferred status that arbitration agreements
now have because federal policy favors them.
VII. CONCLUSION
District courts have struggled over the issue of whether the FAA
precludes issuing an injunction to maintain the status quo pending
arbitration. The language of the FAA and the legislative history do not
prevent the court from doing so. If Congress had intended the FAA to
take away a court's power, then it would have made that intention clear in
the language. Additionally, the Supreme Court has interpreted the main
purpose of the FAA to be enforcement of arbitration agreements" 6 with a
corollary purpose being to move the parties into the arbitration process as
quickly as possible."'
With these purposes in mind, it seems inconsistent that federal
policy favors arbitration, yet would deny courts the power to maintain the
status quo. If one side could alter its status and render arbitration
meaningless, then it seems rather insignificant to have a policy favoring
such meaningless arbitration. Why would such a policy exist if the
arbitration were useless? The district courts must have the power to
determine the propriety of issuing an injunction. The most logical test to
do so is the Fourth Circuit's hollow formality test. This test allows the
courts to prevent meaningless arbitrations and continue the federal policy
favoring arbitration. Congress must have intended the courts to be able to
maintain the status quo and uphold the integrity of the federal policy.
Megan J. F. Williams
104. Id. at 1131.
105. Id.
106. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
107. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

